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JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
Terrance Sandalow*
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.,' Justice Stone
suggested by indirection that there "may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality" when courts are called
upon to determine the validity "of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities."'2 In such cases,

he explained, "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry."' Forty years later, that cautious suggestion has
ripened into an attitude. The fact that legislation bears heavily upon
the interests of a minority has come to be widely regarded as a reason
for subjecting it to closer judicial scrutiny than other legislation whose
constitutionality is challenged and perhaps as creating a presumption
of its invalidity. Yet, exactly what is meant by these conclusions is,
even now, far from certain. With the passing of time, moreover,
the boundaries that circumscribed Stone's suggestion have become
blurred. His reference to "discrete and insular minorities" has been
read not merely as an elaboration of the reason for special judicial
solicitude for "particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial

minorities," but as an open-ended invitation to extend similar protection to an ill-defined assortment of groups that have failed to attain
their objectives through the political process.
To some extent, the uncertain contours of the notion that the
judiciary bears special responsibility for protecting minorities from
legislation injurious to them is a consequence of the continually
changing composition of the Supreme Court in the years since Justice
Stone wrote. The deeper reason for the uncertainty, however, is
that it has never been clear precisely how the fact that legislation
bears heavily upon a minority connects with the conclusion that it
ought to be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. Except as frequency
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
sity of Chicago.-Ed.
1. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
2. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
3. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.

A.B. 1954, J.D. 1957, Univer-
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of repetition may have made it seem so, after all, the connection is
not self-evident. "Democracy" means government by the people,
either directly or through representation. Although a commitment
to it does not entail acceptance of simplistic majoritarianism, there
remains the question why, in a nation generally committed to democratic values, a minority should have a special claim to promote its
interests outside the political process.
The belief that there are grounds for such a claim is the most
frequent manifestation of an older and, very likely, still a more commonly held view, that judicial review is a necessary safeguard of the
rights of minorities. Because of its stress upon rights-entitlements
that are assumed to exist independently of the judicial process-the
traditional view does not imply the degree of judicial activism that
its more recent expression seeks to justify, but it is nonetheless father
to it. What the latter owes to the former, specifically, is the belief
that ." 'holding democracy in judicial tutelage' is the only way that
the 'tyranny of the majority'
has yet been devised for preventing
4
from imposing on the minority."1
My primary purpose in this essay is to explore these two versions
of the argument that courts have a special responsibility for protecting minorities. Proponents of the argument often rely upon both
versions indiscriminately. Yet, the two versions rest upon quite different premises concerning the nature of constitutional law and the
judiciary's responsibility with respect to it. The more traditional version of the argument, that judicial review is a necessary safeguard
of the rights of minorities, posits a conception of the judicial function
that can be accommodated with the nation's commitment to democracy, but it can do so only by embracing a conception of constitutional
law that is inconsistent with our national experience. The more
recent version of the argument, stemming from Justice Stone's suggestion in Carolene Products, rests upon a more satisfactory conception of constitutional law, but this advance is achieved at the cost
of adopting a conception of the judicial function that cannot be
reconciled with democratic values.
In contending that neither version is satisfactory, I do not mean
to suggest that courts have no part to play in protecting minorities
against the hazards they face in the political process. My point,
rather, is that conventional statements of the courts' role, in treating
judges as the watchdogs of democracy, promise more than they can
4. P.
(1970)

KURLAND,

POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION,

AND THE WARREN COURT

182

(quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Everyman ed. 1910) ).
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justify. In the concluding section of this essay, therefore, I shall attempt to sketch an alternative conception of the courts' role, one
that would permit them to protect minorities against the most serious
threats to their interests and yet would respect the ultimate authority
of representative institutions to determine the values to be expressed
by law.

I.
The concern that democratic government will provide inadequate protection for minorities is as old as the nation-perhaps as
old as the idea of democracy itself. The commonly expressed fear
is that prejudice, the pressures or passions of the moment, or simply
the prospect of gain may lead a majority to employ its power with
insufficient respect for the interests of those who are in a minority.
One possible safeguard against these dangers is to insulate certain
interests thought to be fundamental from the hazards of the political
process by adopting a constitution that includes provisions defining
the limits of majority power. The rhetoric of Supreme Court
opinions often employs just this conception of the Constitution.
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights," Mr. Justice Jackson once
wrote in a classic formulation of the conception,
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities ....
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 5
Constitutions, however, are not self-enforcing. The same vices that
may lead a majority to oppress a minority in the absence of a constitution may lead it to act in defiance of constitutional limits upon its
authority. Earlier generations saw the threat primarily in terms of
the hazard it posed for the security of property. More recently, concern has been directed toward threats to freedom of speech and
other noneconomic rights. In either event, the underlying concern
is the same, that a political majority cannot be trusted to respect
rights that the Constitution affirms for all, majority and minority
6
alike.
5. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
6. It is common to refer to "the rights of minorities" or "minority rights," but
both phrases are misleading in suggesting that the rights referred to are uniquely
those of minorities. The Constitution does not purport to protect the interests of
minorities by conferring rights upon them alone. Its premise, rather, is that certain
interests of individuals are to be immunized from governmental authority without re-
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Judicial review is often seen as a corrective for this supposed
deficiency of democracy: since the Constitution is paramount law,
judges can enforce the limitations that it imposes upon legislative authority. And since judges are trained in the traditions of the law
and relatively insulated from popular pressures, they are more likely
than legislatures to respect those limitations. Thus, it is said, judicial
review poses no conflict with democracy. The conflict, if there is
one, is with the antecedent decision to have a constitution that limits
the power of the legislature. Judicial review is merely the instrument by which that decision is enforced.
The difficulty, of course, is that when the constitutionality of
legislation is challenged the point at issue is not whether invalid legislation should be enforced, but whether the legislation is invalid. A
dispute about the meaning of the Constitution is at the heart of the
controversy. The defense of judicial review cannot, thus, rest simply
upon the greater likelihood that courts will respect constitutional
limitations. It must also come to terms with the question why courts,
rather than legislatures, should have final authority to resolve controversies about the meaning of the Constitution.
The original answer to that question, that "[i]t is emphatically the
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
province
is,"' 7 is no longer satisfactory. It reflects a conception of constitutional interpretation that will not explain the evolving content of constitutional law. "[V]ery little of our constitutional law of individual
rights," as Professor Thomas Grey has shown, "has any firm foundation in the model of judicial review which traces from Marbury v.
Madison to Mr. Justice Black."8 In substance, if not in every particular, we have, in Grey's phrase, "an unwritten constitution." Its
content is not fixed by the limits that the framers imposed upon the
power of a majority. It depends, rather, upon evolving conceptions
of the proper role of government in our societyY The question
today, accordingly, is not the same one that Chief Justice Marshall
answered. The question that Marshall answered was whether courts
or legislatures should have final authority to resolve controversies
about the meaning of a document whose content was (understood
to be) fixed at the time of its adoption. The question today is
gard to whether the individuals are members of the majority or of a minority. The
frequent references to the rights so created as "minority rights" merely reflect a
common understanding that minorities may have a greater need for such protection.
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
8. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 718

(1975).
9. See text at notes 30-34 infra.
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whether courts or legislatures should have final authority to resolve
controversies about the meaning of a document whose content
evolves over time.
If constitutional law is to change over time, the legislature's warrant for making the change is, prima facie, a good deal stronger than
that of the courts. No doubt, it would be too facile simply to assert
that it is the province and duty of the legislature to say what the law
should be. Courts commonly exercise lawmaking responsibilities.
But they do so, except when they speak in the name of the Constitution, subject to the revising authority of the legislature. The resulting distribution of authority between courts and the legislature,
if not fully consistent with all interpretations of the democratic ideal,
nonetheless respects its central premises: first, that law should be
responsive to the interests and values of the citizenry, and, second,
that in the long run it will be so only if lawmakers are amenable
to popular control through ordinary political processes. A written
constitution limiting legislative power may be seen as a tolerable
compromise with that ideal in the service of other values. The possibility of reconciling the democratic ideal with constitutional limits
upon legislative authority is considerably more problematic if the
meaning of the Constitution and, therefore, the limits of legislative
power vary over time according to the judgments of politically irresponsible judges concerning the rightful boundaries of the political
process.
In an article published several years ago, Professor Ronald
Dworkin argued that because controversies about the meaning of the
Constitution involve disagreement between a majority and a minority, fairness requires that they be decided by the courts.1" In doing
so, he explicitly rejected the contention that democratic values require the resolution of such controversies through the political
process. To permit the legislature to decide the issues, as a representative of the majority, would, he maintained, violate a fundamental requirement of fairness, that one ought not to be a judge of his
own cause. Dworkin thus appears to view the court's role to be like
that of an umpire in a game and, interestingly, in a later article he
explicitly invokes that analogy."
The persuasiveness of Dworkin's argument depends upon how
one views the task of determining the meaning of the Constitution,
whether as one of discovery or one of creation. An examination of
10. Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, NEw YORK REVIEW OF
May 4, 1972, at 27, 31-32.
11. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HAxv. L. REV. 1057, 1078-82 (1975).

BOOKS,
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his effort to analogize the courts' role to that of an umpire will help
to clarify the point. An umpire, as Dworkin recognizes, exercises
judgment, not choice. His task is to determine whether there has
been compliance with the rules of the game, not what the rules ought
to be. No one supposes that it would be proper for an umpire to
legislate new rules as a game progresses, not even if he believed
that its fairness or quality would be improved by the change. The
question, then, is whether determining the validity of legislation is
an activity, like that of an umpire, involving only the application of
preexisting standards or whether it also involves legislating the rules
by which constitutionality is determined. Dworkin conceives of the
activity in the former way. He believes that rules of constitutional
law exist that are sufficient to furnish an answer for every constitutional controversy. Discovering those rules may of course be very
difficult, so difficult that, as he acknowledges in his most recent explication of the thesis, only Hercules, "a lawyer of superhuman skill,
learning, patience, and acumen," would be capable of it., 2 Nevertheless, they are there, and because they are fairness requires that
those who claim their protection receive an impartial determination
of that claim.
Since Dworkin writes in the latter part of the twentieth century,
and not in the early years of the nineteenth, his claim that rules of
constitutional law exist cannot rest upon as simple a foundation as
Marshall's. In Marshall's time, it may have been adequate merely
to inquire what a court was to do if a legislature passed a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, thereby treating the meaning of the relevant constitutional prohibitions as, if not self-evident, at least determinate.1" Two hundred years' experience under the Constitution
has shown that the problem is more complex. If there is a correct
answer to every constitutional question, as Dworkin claims, it nonetheless cannot be unchanging. The influence of altered circumstances and values has too frequently led to reinterpretation of the document to permit us now to accept a static theory of constitutional law.
To establish the "fairness" justification for judicial review, accordingly, Dworkin must show that constitutional law can evolve by a
process that does not require courts to choose among contending values.
I cannot within the confines of this essay adequately summarize
Dworkin's extraordinarily complex argument in support of his position,
12. Id. at 1083.
13. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803).
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much less undertake a systematic critique of it. Much of the argument seems to me to provide a useful prescription for judges (or
anyone else) called upon to interpret the Constitution. But I regard
his claim that constitutional interpretation involves the discovery of
existing rules, and not a choice among competing values, as little
short of fanciful.
Dworkin's effort to maintain that position, while preserving the
capacity of constitutional law to reflect changing circumstances and
values, leads him to employ a strategy that, in one or another form,
is common to all efforts to derive from the Constitution principles
relevant to a world that could not have been anticipated when the
document was adopted. He reads the language of the Constitution
at a very high level of abstraction, in effect as a license to interpret
its provisions as the embodiment of the evolving moral conceptions
of successive generations. Thus, he writes, in deciding upon the
constitutionality of the death penalty,
[i]t would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the
fact that when the [cruel and unusual punishment] clause was
adopted capital punishment was standard and unquestioned. That
would be decisive if the framers of the clause had meant to lay down
a particular conception of cruelty . . . . But it is not decisive of
the different question the Court now faces, which is this: can the
Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the concept of cruelty,
14
now defend a conception that excludes death?
One might suppose that in deciding what is "cruel" (or "due
process," "freedom of speech," etc.) a judge would be required to
choose among competing values, thereby destroying the analogy
betweeen his task and that of an umpire. Dworkin argues, however,
that a judge is not to decide such questions, he is to determine their
answer. His task is to ascertain the principles that underlie the
nation's moral judgments, as they have evolved through history. In
making that determination, the relevant judgments are not those that
would be revealed by a Gallup poll, but those that would result from
the structure of principles that underlie the morality of the community.
Dworkin maintains that this process does not involve the exercise
of discretion. It is, however, difficult to see how that can be so. As
14. Dworkin, supra note 10, at 28. Dworkin follows John Rawls in distinguishing between "concepts" and "conceptions:"
The difference is a difference not just in the detail of the instruction given but
in the kind of instruction given. When I appeal to the concept of fairness I appeal to what fairness means, and I give my views on that issue no special standing. When I lay down a conception of fairness, I lay down what I mean by
fairness, and my view is therefore the heart of the matter.
Id. (emphasis original). See also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1971).
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a matter of logic, the materials to which Dworkin would look in the
effort to ascertain the community's morality 5 can be explained by
an infinite number of principles, just as any number of points can
be connected by an infinite number of curves.' 6 Although any
human lawyer might find it impossible to discover a single principle
which would suffice for that purpose, Hercules would discover an
infinite number and would, therefore, confront the necessity of
choosing from among them. Of course, on Dworkin's argument,
Hercules would not be required, would not even be permitted, to
make that choice if it had already been made by the community.
But it is not obvious how even Hercules could know the community's
choice. The only materials available to him would be those from
which he is to draw the principles that underlie the community's
morality. Once he commenced the effort, he would, being Hercules,
see that there were an infinite number of possibilities. Even if he
believed that the community had adopted only one, he would have
no way of ascertaining it.
Dworkin's answer to the problem of how Hercules is to select
from among alternative descriptions of the community's morality
merely underscores the need for choice. Hercules must, Dworkin
writes, approach the question before him not just as a problem of
achieving a coherent account of community morality, but also as posing an issue of moral and political philosophy. 7 He is to select the
"best" account of the community's morality. Competing philosophical traditions may, however, be expected to yield different
conclusions about which account is best. Hercules cannot choose
from among the traditions simply by determining which supports a
coherent account of the community's morality since, by hypothesis,
alternative coherent accounts are supported by different philosophical traditions. Unless Dworkin means merely to clothe in different
garb a claim that natural law provides a controlling standard, a claim
he neither avows nor defends, Hercules is ultimately left without a
standard by which he can determine the validity of capital punishment. He must decide.
It is of course true, as Dworkin argues, that when Hercules
decides he will not claim that his choice is best because he has
15. These appear to be the conventional materials of judicial decision (constitutional text, statutes, judicial precedent, etc.), subject to the interpretive techniques
that are commonly employed in dealing with them. See Dworkin, supra note 11,
at 1082-1101.
16. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 35 (1933); H. REICHENBACu, EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION 373-74 (1938).
17. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 1084.
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chosen it, but that he has chosen it because it is best.' In the absence of a controlling external standard, however, Hercules' claim
that his choice is best has no apparent meaning other than that he
thinks it is best. There is no reason to suppose that another judge
with the same extraordinary capacities, say, Hercules fils, would not
make a different choice. To be sure, Hercules pare and fils would
each feel constrained to decide as he has. In that sense, it might
be said that neither is exercising discretion. But the existence of
such subjective constraints is hardly to the point. What is crucial
is that different judges, because of their different values, may be led
to adopt different versions of the community's morality, each of
which provides a fully coherent account of the judgments that they
are bound to respect.
A lawyer who lacks Hercules' extraordinary capacities will, of
course, not confront the same problems as Hercules, but he also will
be unable to avoid the necessity of choice. His problem is likely to
be that he cannot discover even a single principle that adequately
accounts for all the judgments he is attempting to explain. Although
he will be able to identify a number of candidates, none is likely
to provide a perfect fit. In consequence, it will appear to him that
the community's morality does not represent a coherent set of judgments. If he is to draw a principle from those judgments, accordingly, he will be required to conclude that some of them do not truly
reflect the community's moral sense and, therefore, that he is entitled to ignore them. Deciding which judgments to ignore, however, requires choice. No doubt, the choice is constrained. A
lawyer could not convincingly argue that, in a constitutional sense,
imprisonment is "cruel," nor could he convincingly deny that maiming is. The contrary judgment is in each case too widely and deeply
accepted. Judgments such as these are the starting points from
which one begins in constructing principles. But there are also more
doubtful judgments and, in deciding which is to be taken into account and which ignored, choice is inescapable.
The jurisprudence of the twentieth century has, therefore, not
been wrong in concluding that law is not discovered, but constructed
and that the rules judges apply do not exist independently of the
process by which they are articulated. At times, Dworkin himself
comes close to recognizing this, as, for example, when he writes:
It does not follow from the fact that the man in the street disapproves
of abortion, or supports legislation making it criminal, that he has
18. Id. at 1101-03.
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considered whether the concept of dignity presupposed by the Constitution, consistently applied, supports his political position. That is
a sophisticated question requiring some dialectical skill, and though
that skill may be displayed by the ordinary man when he selfconsciously defends his position, it is not to be taken for granted that
his political preferences, expressed casually or in the ballot, have been
subjected to that form of examination."
Dworkin rightly stresses the importance of the dialectical process, but
he nonetheless fails to give it its due. He sees that a judgment that
would prohibit abortion is suspect if it has not emerged from such
a process, but he fails to see that the structure of principles by which
he would describe the community's morality must emerge from the
same process. It is precis ely because such a process does not underlie the community's moral judgments that a judge attempting to articulate principles that explain those judgments is engaged in a creative activity. The task in which he is engaged requires that he make
choices that the community has not yet confronted. It is in that sense
that the judge is necessarily a legislator.
The dialectical process, to put the point somewhat differently,
is concerned with achieving consistency. A demonstration that a
particular decision would be inconsistent with principles that are
necessary to support decisions made at an earlier time, and to which
there is a continuing sense of commitment, counts against the former.
But it does not provide a decisive objection to that decision. Consistency may be achieved by abandoning the commitment to the earlier
decisions. Suppose, for example, that a judge is called upon to determine whether capital punishment is "cruel" in a constitutional
sense. Following Dworkin, the judge constructs a theory that "best"
accounts for all prior judgments that he is bound to consider. Even
if that theory is inconsistent with the imposition of capital punishment, a decision to invalidate a statute imposing such punishment
would not simply be an expression of the community's moral principles. The judge has ascertained only that there is an inconsistency
among the community's moral judgments. He cannot ascertain how
the community would resolve the inconsistency for the simple reason
that it has not done so. Confronted with the inconsistency, the community, acting through the political process, might abandon capital
punishment. But it is also possible that it would, to the extent necessary, abandon the judgments from which the judge drew his account
of the community's conception of cruelty.
19. Id. at 1107-08.
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Whether the judge sustains or invalidates capital punishment,
accordingly, his decision cannot be justified as an effort to achieve
correspondence with an existing societal morality. He is engaged
in a creative, a legislative, activity, for in deciding he makes a choice
that has not been made before. Nothing in Dworkin's theory tells
us how that choice should be made. More important, for present
purposes, nothing in Dworkin's theory tells us why that choice should
be made by the judge and not through the political process. His
claim is only that fairness requires an impartial determination if
the appeal is to an existing standard that governs the situation. But
even if that is so, the notion that constitutional law affords such a
standard is chimerical.
Several years ago, a student in one of my classes attempted to
defend the "fairness" justification for judicial review and the aptness
of the umpire analogy by arguing that if rules were to be legislated
during the course of a game, it would be preferable, because fairer,
that the umpire do so rather than one of the players. This is a clever
ploy, but it misses the central point. A game implies antecedent
rules. Once it is understood that the constitutional law does not consist of rules embedded in the Constitution and that it cannot aim at
correspondence with independently existing principles of societal
morality, the utility of the game analogy and of notions of fairness
drawn from it are at an end. Received ideas of fairness do not require an impartial decision when rules are to be legislated. To the
contrary, although lack of a feasible alternative at times leads to the
use of arbiters, other decisional processes, such as bargaining or voting, are more commonly employed in making such decisions. The
question, then, is why such processes should be considered inappropriate in deciding the meaning to be given the Constitution.
II.
The idea that legislation directed against minorities should be
subjected to close judicial scrutiny arises out of the breakdown of
the belief that there are immanent rules of constitutional law. So
long as judies are seen to be enforcing rules contained in the Constitution, there is no place for the notion that they owe differing degrees of deference to different kinds of legislation. Statutes either
conform to those rules or they do not. And so, to recall Mr. Justice
Roberts' familiar dictum, a court's only task when "an Act of Congress is appropriately challenged

. . .

as not conforming to the con-

stitutional mandate" is "to lay the article of the Constitution which
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is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the former. ' 20 Roberts understood,
more than the frequently amused references to his dictum imply, that
the task is not mechanical, but he wrote within a tradition that saw
the task as calling for judgment, not choice. By the time Roberts
wrote, however, that tradition was dying, a victim of several decades
of sustained attack by legal realism.
The now-common perception that the rules enforced by courts
are not contained in the Constitution poses a formidable challenge
for the institution of judicial review. If constitutional rules are a
product of judicial choice, the inevitable question is why, in a
democracy, they should be permitted to control the decisions embodied in legislation. It is, after all, one thing to view the courts
as enforcing a law of determinate content, a kind of social contract
binding upon all because assented to by all, and quite another to view
them as imposing their own conceptions of public policy upon governmental institutions that are more directly subject to popular
control.
The realist critique thus dealt a devastating blow to the argument
that judicial review is a necessary safeguard of the rights of minorities. The crucial premise of that argument is that the rights protected by courts were established in the Constitution. With the
abandonment of the notion that the meaning of the Constitution
inheres in the document, a radical transformation is required in the
idea of a constitutional right. Constitutional rights can no longer be
said to "exist," for their existence can only be determined post hoc:
the "rights" of a minority are those of its interests that courts have
accorded protection in the name of the Constitution. To define
"rights" in this way, however, is to raise anew the question that the
"minority rights" thesis is supposed to answer: why should a minority be able to look to a court for protection from legislative action?
If rights are merely interests-interests that presumably must be
weighed against other interests-why shouldn't the balance struck
by the legislature be conclusive?
Justice Stone's answer to that question in Carolene Products was
to direct attention to the quality of the process leading to the legislative decision. In general, as the decision in that case demonstrated, Stone believed that the task of striking a balance among competing interests is for legislatures and that courts ought to defer to
their decisions. On occasion, however, a "special condition" might
20. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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exist justifying distrust of "those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon .

. . ."

A "searching judicial inquiry" might, in such

situations, serve as a corrective for the deficiencies of the political
process. Justice Stone had earlier made a similar argument in discussing the judicial role when state legislation is challenged under
the commerce clause.

In South CarolinaState Highway Department

v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,-1 decided little more than two months prior
to Carolene Products,he had written for the Court that
when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely
to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within
22
the state..

Justice Stone's reliance upon this passage to support his suggestion
that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" might be a
"special condition" warranting "searching judicial inquiry" of legislation directed against such minorities implied that the two situations
are analogous.
There is, however, a crucial difference between legislation held
to be invalid because unduly parochial and legislation held invalid

because of its effect upon the interests of a minority. The vice of
the former is that it is enacted by a legislature that is not politically
responsible to all who are affected by it. A decision invalidating
the legislation does not withdraw from the political process the question whether the objectives sought by proponents of the legislation
are proper. It seeks, rather, to elicit an answer to that question from
a more broadly representative legislature. The court thus acts not
as a check upon democracy, but in its service. Precisely the
opposite is true when legislation is invalidated because of its effect
upon a minority. The court's action is not in the service of democracy, but a limitation upon it. The minority has not, typically, been
excluded from the political process leading to enactment of the legislation. It has simply lost. What Justice Stone's suggestion fails to
provide is a reason why, having lost, the minority should be entitled
to review of the legislative decision in the courts.
Professor John Hart Ely has recently offered an interpretation
of Justice Stone's thesis that suggests such a reason. 3 When legisla21. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
22. 303 U.S. at 184 n.2.
23. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723 (1974). Although Ely is primarily intent upon demonstrating that courts
are justified in treating as "suspect" any legislation directed against a racial minority,
he is seemingly prepared to have the courts subject legislation to closer than normal
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tion singles out a minority for disadvantageous treatment, Ely argues,
there is less basis than normally exists for confidence in the underlying assessment of costs and benefits by the legislature: since the
costs of the legislation are not broadly distributed through the society,
but are imposed only upon a minority, there is reason to fear that
they have been undervalued. Hence, the balance of interests struck
by the legislature is likely to be based upon a distorted assessment
of the relative weight of the costs and benefits of the legislation.
Stated this broadly, the argument would subject to close judicial scrutiny a substantial fraction of all legislation. Ely narrows the argument, however, and in so doing brings it closer to Justice Stone's concern for "discrete and insular minorities," by limiting it to situations
in which the majority responsible for enacting the legislation consists
of persons who have never been and expect never to be members
of the affected minority.
Even with the gloss placed upon it by Professor Ely, Stone's suggestion is less persuasive than might be supposed from its broad
acceptance. Neither Stone nor Ely contends that all legislation
directed against a "discrete and insular minority" is invalid. Their
claim is only that such legislation is "suspect." But if such legislation
is sometimes valid and sometimes invalid, there must be standards
by which a determination can be made. Yet, neither Stone nor Ely
explicitly addresses the question how courts are to establish the
legitimacy of the standards they employ to make the determination.
It is, in other words, unclear exactly what it is that minorities are
24
to be protected against.
Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Minersville School District
v. Gobitis,"- 5 the first case in which he acted upon the suggestion he had
made in Carolene Products, offers a convenient illustration of the
problem. In Gobitis, it will be recalled, the Court sustained the authority of a local school board to expel two students, members of
Jehovah's Witnesses, who refused to participate in a daily flag salute
ceremony. Stone's dissent was devoted primarily to defining the inscrutiny whenever any minority is singled out for disadvantageous treatment. He
does, however, suggest a number of theories for narrowing the argument he advances.
Id. at 734 n.45. None of the refinements affect the discussion in the text.
24. It is, moreover, unclear just who it is that is to be protected. Justice Stone
seems to have had in mind only racial, national, or religious minorities. But the reason he advanced for granting special protection to these groups, that the political process might not adequately protect "discrete and insular minorities," is potentially ap-

plicable to other groups as well. Yet, without further specification of the defects in
the political process that call for "searching judicial inquiry," it is hard to know
which groups should be the beneficiaries of this special judicial solicitude.
25. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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dividual and governmental interests at stake in the controversy and
to an argument that the former outweighed the latter. For Stone
to have rested only upon that argument, however, would have left
his position vulnerable to the counter-argument made by Justice
Frankfurter on behalf of the Court, that "so long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed,"
the task of balancing competing interests is political, not judicial. '
Stone's answer to Frankfurter was to invoke Carolene Products.
After paraphrasing the suggestion that courts have a special role in
protecting "discrete and insular minorities," he wrote:
Here we have.

. .

a small minority entertaining in good faith a religi-

ous belief, which is such a departure from the usual course of human
conduct, that most persons are disposed to regard it with little toleration or concern. In such circumstances careful scrutiny of legislative
efforts

. . .

is especially needful if civil rights are to receive any pro-

tection. Tested by this standard, I am not prepared to say that the
rights of this small and 27helpless minority .
the interest of the state.

is to be overborne by

If the references to "civil rights" and the "rights of this small and
helpless minority" are to be understood to mean, as Chief Justice
Marshall and Professor Dworkin would have it, that the Constitution
establishes certain limits upon governmental authority, the fact that
the compulsory flag salute burdened only a minority adds nothing
to the argument. Immunity from that burden either is or is not
one of the rights established by the Constitution. To be sure, the
fact that the burden fell only upon a minority provided the occasion
for judicial review-if the burden had fallen with equal weight upon
the majority, presumably it would not have been enacted-but there
is no apparent reason why it should enter into the argument about
whether the right exists. In principle, the right and judicial role in
enforcing it should be the same even if a majority of the population
were burdened.
Justice Stone's insistence upon the need for "careful [judicial]
scrutiny" because a "small and helpless minority" was distinctively
burdened thus seems to presuppose that the Constitution does not
itself enact the immunity claimed in Gobitis. The underlying notion
appears to be that the Court is to decide whether there should be
an immunity by balancing the competing interests of the state and
the affected individuals. But if the immunity is not enacted by the
Constitution, how is the Court to establish the legitimacy of a conclu26. 310 U.S. at 599.
27. 310 U.S. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1176 1976-1977

April-May 1977]

Protection of Minorities

1177

sion that a compulsory flag salute imposes an impermissible burden
upon objecting students? The call for "careful scrutiny" obscures
the fact that when scrutiny ends there remains the need for a
decision-and hence the necessity of justifying the decision.
Now a decision can be justified in only two ways, either by
demonstrating that it conforms to a controlling standard or that it is
the result of a process that is appropriate for making such decisions.
Courts traditionally have attempted to justify constitutional decisions
in the former way. Justice Stone's emphasis on the deficiencies of
the legislative process looks toward the second type of justification:
courts can legitimately substitute their judgments for those of legislatures, at least when they are determining the validity of legislation
directed against minorities, because the judicial process is more appropriate than the legislative for making the choices that are required
in that setting.
It is hard to see how, in its pure form, such a position can be
defended-and, to my knowledge, no student of constitutional law
has seriously attempted to do so."' Prevailing ideas of fairness, as
suggested above, do not call for impartial decisions when rules are
to be legislated. To the contrary, processes of decision that permit
participation by those affected are generally regarded as more appropriate for that purpose. No one supposes, for example, that fairness
requires courts to substitute their judgments for those of legislatures
with respect to tax rates for the wealthy, the level of welfare payments for the poor, or the content of regulations imposed upon milk
producers in the interest of consumers. Such issues, it is commonly
understood, are to be resolved through the political process, and that
is so even though there is a risk that the majority will not fully appreciate the costs that are imposed upon the minority. Yet, if the argument for an active judicial role in protecting minorities rests simply
upon a claim that fairness requires impartial decisions to settle conflicts between a majority and a minority, these cases do not differ
from those in which courts are now generally held to be entitled to
substitute their judgments for those of legislatures.
Nor is it obvious that other arguments might be marshaled to
support a contention that standards fashioned by the judiciary to
settle conflicts between a majority and a minority are justified merely
because of the process from which they have emerged. As a nation,
we are committed to the idea that government, to be ethically de28. Though perhaps Judge J. Skelly Wright came close in Hobson v. Hansen, 269

F. Supp. 401, 506-08 (D.D.C. 1967), affd. as modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,

408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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fensible, requires the consent of the governed. The notion that the
requisite consent might be found in an ancestral assent to be governed by institutions that lack continuing responsibility to the
citizenry was rejected long ago. Since pre-Revolutionary times, the
active and continuous participation of the governed in their government, either directly or by representation, government "of" and "by"
the people, has been understood to be central to the democratic
ideal. Courts not only are unable to draw upon this source of
legitimacy, but in setting their judgment against that of the legislature, they oppose the very agency of government that is most clearly
entitled to do so.
Since judicial decisions protecting minorities cannot be justified
solely by reference to the process from which they emerge, their justification must depend upon a demonstration that they conform to
a controlling standard. Yet, the courts' inability to make such a
demonstration is what led Justice Stone to seek a justification for the
Court's constitutional role in the deficiencies of the legislative process. If neither justification is available, how are judgments of the
kind required by Carolene Productsto be defended?
For some years now, the conventional answer to that question
has drawn upon weaker versions of both justifications. The heart
of the argument is a claim that the Constitution should not be read
as prescribing rules, but as committing the nation to certain values.
Such a reading is said to be appropriate because the Constitution was
"intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs."' " Its provisions
must, accordingly, be read with sufficient breadth to accommodate
changing circumstances and the heightened understanding of successive generations regarding the requirements for achieving the goals
that it establishes. Ultimate responsibility for this accommodation,
the argument continues, is better entrusted to courts than to legislatures. Their relative isolation from men and events and their commitment to the processes of reason helps free them from momentary
pressures and passions and permits them to take a longer view, thereby
increasing the prospects that due recognition will be given to the
values contained in the Constitution.
It is worth noting that nothing in the argument thus far suggests
a more active role for courts in reviewing legislation directed against
minorities than in reviewing any other legislation. Courts are simply
29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)
original).,

(emphasis
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held to have general responsibility for determining whether legislation is adequately respectful of constitutional values. The notion
that in discharging that responsibility courts sometimes owe deference to legislative judgments and that they owe less deference to
legislation directed against minorities than to legislation generally depends upon a number of additional considerations. If the Constitution is read as embodying broad values, not detailed prescriptions,
the decision whether legislation is valid will, of necessity, frequently
depend upon an appraisal of complex factual issues and subsidiary
value choices not specified in the Constitution, both of which are
within the province of the legislature. Since the areas of judicial
and legislative competence are not neatly separable, there is an everpresent risk that courts will either encroach upon the legislature's
prerogatives or fail to discharge their responsibility for the protection
of constitutional values. Justice Stone's suggestion in Carolene
Products may be seen as an effort to escape from this dilemma.
Courts may safely defer to the judgments underlying legislation that
touches upon constitutionally protected interests if the burden of the
legislation is broadly distributed through the population. In such circumstances, a fair evaluation of those interests is likely to be
achieved through the political process, and judicial review is necessary only for the aberrant cases in which the disregard of constitutional values is clear. But the political process offers no such assurance of a fair evaluation of constitutionally protected interests when
only the interests of a minority are adversely affected. Hence, the
need for close judicial scrutiny.
The persuasiveness of this argument depends upon how close a
relationship exists between the values that receive expression in contemporary constitutional law and those that were written into the
Constitution by the framers. The closer that relationship the more
persuasive the claim that judicial review serves primarily to assure
adequate respect for the latter. Conversely, as the relationship
diminishes, the claim becomes more tenuous, and the more courts
must be seen as subjecting the political process to limits whose legitimacy has yet to be established.
From this perspective, the fatal weakness of the argument is its
facile assumption that the values expressed in contemporary constitutional law are those written into the Constitution by the framers.
At nearly every crucial point, and especially in those areas of constitutional law concerned with protecting minorities, the values of the
present, not those of the past, play a dominant role in determining
the content of constitutional doctrine. During the past two decades,
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the equal protection clause has served as the main vehicle for judicial
protection of minorities. The decisions that limit legislative power
in reliance upon that clause necessarily depend, as I have argued
elsewhere, upon value premises that cannot be derived from the text
or the intentions of those responsible for its adoption." ° Apart from
its immediate historical purpose of assuring blacks equality with
whites in respect of (what were understood to be) the necessary incidents of freedom, 3 ' the clause can fairly be read only as proscribing
unreasonable classifications. The crucial judgment is whether a
classification is unreasonable, and that judgment, as the subsequent
history of the clause demonstrates, depends upon the values of a later
day. Thus, a Supreme Court committed to the values of a laissezfaire economy found a good deal of "irrationality" in governmental
regulation of the economy. With the passing of that commitment,
reasons were found to support classifications that would once have
been considered unreasonable. Today, similarly, when the equal
protection clause is employed to protect aliens, illegitimates, and indigent defendants, the underlying values that are expressed are not
those of the Reconstruction Congress but of the present.
The influence of contemporary values is no less dominant in
shaping the constitutional doctrines that have evolved under relatively more specific provisions of the Constitution, provisions such
as those guaranteeing "the freedom of speech [and] of the press"
and the right of a criminal defendant "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Of course, the values of the present are not
wholly unrelated to those of the past. One may find in contemporary
constitutional doctrine echoes of the concerns expressed by the
framers in the limits that they imposed upon government. But they
are only echoes, and often very distant ones. The contrary claim,
that the values written into those provisions significantly inform contemporary constitutional judgment, depends upon abstracting those
values from the particular limits that the framers meant to impose
upon government. Abstracting the values from their historical context, however, inevitably leads to their distortion. Values do not
exist in the abstract; they are forged in response to particular circumstances and in the collision of multiple purposes that impose bounds
upon one another. Wrenching the framers' values, their "larger purposes," from the particular limits they meant to impose upon government leads to a loss of perspective, a perspective that might better
30. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility
and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 654-57 (1975).

31. See id. at 664-66.
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enable courts to see that those limitations were not imperfect expressions of a larger purpose but a particular accommodation of competing purposes. In freeing themselves from those judgments, courts
are not serving larger ends determined by the framers but are making room for the introduction of contemporary values. Thus, decisions such as Johnson v. Zerbst,"' 2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,13 and those extending constitutional protection to sexually
explicit materials,3 4 decisions that are at the core of contemporary
constitutional tradition, are not in any significant sense derived from
the Constitution, viewed as an historical document. The justification
for them, as for the great bulk of our constitutional law of individual
rights, depends rather upon an evolving constitutional tradition that
owes far more to the values of the twentieth century than to those
of the late eighteenth.
If the values expressed in constitutional law are not derived from
the Constitution but, as the late Alexander Bickel once wrote, from
"the evolving morality of our tradition,"3 5 it is not apparent what
courts are to look for when they subject legislation directed against
minorities to close scrutiny. Precisely because that tradition is evolving, it cannot afford the courts a scale for determining whether the
values it embraces have been given due weight by the legislature.
The notion that certain types of legislation should be subjected to
close scrutiny assumes, in other words, a degree of fixity in constitutional values. But if the values expressed by constitutional law
change over time, by what standard are courts to determine whether
a particular step in the evolutionary process is or is not permissible?
To put the point more concretely, suppose that after full debate
Congress were now to enact a compulsory flag salute similar to that
involved in Gobitis. How is a court, upon complaint of an objecting
student, to decide whether Congress has given due weight to the first
amendment values invoked by the student? Ultimately, that decision
must turn upon the answers to a series of interconnected empirical
and value questions that Congress seems more competent to answer
than a court." ' But assuming for the moment that the congressional
32. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
33. 376 U.S. 255 (1964).
34. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 979-1039
(4th ed. 1975).
35. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 236 (1962).
36. For example, are the fostering of patriotism and a sense of national identity
appropriate objectives of the public schools; do flag salute ceremonies serve those objectives; would the effectiveness of the ceremonies, for the mass of children, be diminished if some children were excused; how heavy a burden do such ceremonies impose
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judgment is to be considered suspect because of a fear that the political process does not properly value the interests of minorities, there
remains the question how the court is to decide the crucial value
questions, whether the congressional objectives are permissible and,
if so, whether they outweigh the burden imposed upon dissenting
students. No one supposes that the judges are entitled to employ
their personal values in fashioning an answer to those questions.
Yet, if they are to look to an evolving social morality, what surer
evidence can there be of its present state than congressional enactment of the legislation after full debate?
A court might, of course, seek to demonstrate that the challenged
legislation is in some sense an aberration, that it does not truly reflect the enduring values of the society. At its best, such an effort
would take the form urged by Professor Dworkin, an attempt to
demonstrate that a compulsory flag salute is inconsistent with the
values reflected in other judgments broadly accepted in the society,
judgments embodied in legislation, court decisions, and the expected
response to hypothetical cases. But even if the demonstration were
successful, the court would, as argued above, have succeeded in
showing only the existence of an inconsistency, not how the inconsistency should be resolved. It could not determine that Congress had
failed to give due weight to first amendment values because the tradition that determines the weight those values are to be given is an
evolving one. If the court is to judge from within an evolving tradition, in other words, it lacks the fixed point of reference that is
necessary for deciding whether first amendment values were given
their due. And if it attempts to define a fixed point of reference
outside the tradition, it confronts an inability to justify its standard.
The awareness of this dilemma has contributed to the courts'
increasing reliance upon the equal protection clause, especially to
protect minorities. In contrast with decisions under "substantive"
provisions such as the first amendment or the due process clause,
decisions that rest upon the equal protection clause may appear to
leave questions concerning the proper limits of the political process
to legislative resolution, permitting courts to provide significant protection for the interests of minorities without arrogating to themselves
power to make value choices they cannot justify. As Mr. Justice
Jackson wrote in the classic statement of the argument:
upon children who, for religious or other reasons, object to participating in them; are
there alternative means by which the congressional objectives might be achieved that
would be less burdensome to objecting students; what would be the costs of such alternatives; and so on.
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Invocation of the equal protection clause . . . does not disable

any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader
impact. .

. The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should

not forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
that might be visited upon them if
escape the political retribution
3T
larger numbers were affected.
The difficulty, of course, is that legislatures do not act irrationally.
A legislative decision to treat a minority differently from the majority
always rests upon some policy. Deciding whether that policy warrants distinctive treatment of the minority requires value choices no
less difficult for courts to justify than those that equal protection
analysis in theory permits them to avoid, choices that may indeed,
because of the absence of any textual support for them, be more
difficult to justify than those required under relatively more specific
provisions.
III.
As the preceding pages demonstrate, the task of defining and
justifying the role that courts may legitimately play in protecting
minorities must be accomplished within a larger framework of ideas
concerning the appropriate sources of constitutional judgment and the
proper limits of judicial authority in a democracy. Constructing such
a framework is not a suitable undertaking for a brief essay. Nevertheless, since I believe that courts do have an important and a
legitimate part to play in protecting minorities against the ordinary
workings of the political process, it would be inappropriate to conclude without suggesting the grounds for that judgment. Very
briefly, therefore, I want to sketch the outlines of an argument that
would afford minorities judicial protection against the most serious
risks they face in the political process and yet, by respecting the ultimate authority of the political process to determine the values to
be expressed by law, meet the criticism that in protecting minorities
courts are acting inconsistently with democratic values.
The central problem that courts confront in erecting constitutional protections for minorities is no different from that which they
37. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-11 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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face in dealing with other constitutional problems, an inability to justify the standards they employ to limit the permissible outcomes of
the political process. The source of that problem, I want to suggest,
is the failure of doctrines defining the judicial role in constitutional
adjudication to come fully to terms with a fundamental change that
has occurred over the past several decades in the way that constitutional law is conceived. Prevailing doctrines defining that role are
still, in large measure, the product of a time when the rules of constitutional law were understood to be embedded in or at least derivable
from the Constitution. Partly as a result of substantive changes in
constitutional law, but even more as a consequence of changing ideas
about the nature of law, that conception of constitutional law is no
longer persuasive. To account satisfactorily for its content and the
functions it performs, constitutional law must now be understood as
the means by which effect is given to those ideas that from time to
time are held to be fundamental in defining the limits and distribution of governmental power in our society. So profound a change
in the sources of constitutional judgment requires the reexamination
of doctrines defining the judicial role in constitutional adjudication.
Of course, that reexamination has to some extent occurred and, as
suggested above, it has led to some changes in the way that the
courts' role is geneially understood.3 8 Nevertheless, there remain
doctrines that developed corollary to the earlier conception of constitutional law that have uncritically been given continued effect.
Thus, traditional constitutional analysis generally regards the
decisionmaking process that precedes governmental action as irrelevant to the action's validity.3' This indifference to process is manifested, first, by a failure to take into account where in the hierarchy
of government an allegedly invalid decision was made. Illustratively, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4" which

overruled Gobitis, is conventionally understood as establishing the invalidity of compulsory flag salute ceremonies in public schools
without regard to whether the requirement is adopted by an administrative agency, as occurred in that case, or by a school board, a state
legislature, or the Congress. The lack of concern for process is
revealed also by the courts' frequent failure to consider whether enactment of allegedly invalid legislation was preceded by legislative
38. See text at notes 21-23 supra.
39. The obvious exceptions are those situations in which the Constitution is read
to guarantee or prohibit a particular decisionmaking process, as for example the guaranty of a jury trial or the prohibition of bills of attainder.
40. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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consideration of the controlling issues. For example, in United
States v. O'Brien,41 the Supreme Court, effectively deferring to Congress by failing to canvass the need for such legislation, sustained
a statute prohibiting "draft card burning" even though the Congress
had given no attention to any of the issues upon which the statute's
constitutionality depended and had failed even to recognize the
possibility that the prohibited conduct was a form of speech arguably
entitled to constitutional protection.1 2 As a result, legislation that
concededly impinged upon first amendment values was given effect
without a deliberate judgment by either Congress or the Court that
the encroachment was justified.
Judicial indifference to the decisionmaking process underlying
challenged governmental action follows naturally from a model of
constitutional adjudication that assumes rules of constitutional law are
embedded in or can be derived from the Constitution. Since those
rules are assumed to have an existence independent of the process
by which they are announced, there is no reason why the decisionmaking process that precedes governmental action should influence
a judgment about its consistency with the rules. The action is either
consistent with the rules or it is not.
But the same is not trUe when constitutional law is understood
as the expression of evolving societal norms. A court cannot lay a
challenged statute beside a societal norm and decide whether the former squares with the latter. Societal norms are not a "brooding omnipresence" merely awaiting discovery by a sufficiently keen observer.
They must be constructed and, inevitably, their construction must be
effected through some process.4" A judgment whether governmental action is consistent with societal norms is, for that reason, closely
bound up with judgments about the process through which the norms
should be constructed. In deciding whether governmental action
does conform to societal norms, accordingly, a court must consider
whether, by reason of the decisionmaking process leading to it, the
action ought to be understood as establishing those norms.
The central problem in devising a satisfactory theory of judicial
review is, thus, to define and justify the process by which societal
norms should be constructed for the purpose of giving content to constitutional law. Familiar arguments persuasively support the partici41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning
Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 3-6.
43. See text at notes 14-19 supra.
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pation of courts in that process. 44 Just as every "intuitive twitch"
is not to be taken as expressing the values of an individual, not every
action of government is to be understood as expressing the values
of the society. 4 5 Deciding whether one or another action is consistent with our values requires reflection. Judicial review, in Justice
Stone's familiar phrase, offers the opportunity for a "sober second
thought,"46 an occasion for considering whether challenged governmental action is consistent with broadly shared societal values. By
subjecting such action to the test of principle-a test of conformity
with principles that are themselves subject to being tested by the results that they imply-courts can increase the prospects that governmental action will conform to those values. Of course, courts are
not the only institutions of government capable of testing action
against principle, but experience suggests that because of their practices and their place in the governmental system they are more likely
than others to do so.
These arguments, however, demonstrate only that courts have a
part to play in the process of deciding whether governmental action
conforms to societal values, not that their decisions should be final.
Since societal values cannot be directly apprehended, the principles
that courts employ to test governmental action must be understood
as expressing not the values of society as such but a particular construction of those values. No doubt, that construction will often correspond to a consensus within the society. Thus, as I suggested
earlier, no one can doubt that, within the traditions of our society,
maiming is cruel and imprisonment is not. Our confidence in that
judgment rests in part upon the certainty that a broadly representative political process would not, after deliberation, reach a decision
inconsistent with it. When courts are called upon to consider the
validity of legislation, however, the source of that confidence is obviously no longer present. The question then is whether a court's
construction of those values should prevail over the decision of the
legislature.
If constitutional law is to be understood as expressing contemporary societal norms, it is hard to see how courts can, in the end,
set their judgment concerning the content of those norms against a
deliberate and broadly based political decision, say, one made by
44. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 35, at 24-27.

45. The phrase is Thomas Grey's. Grey, The First Virtue, 25 STAN. L. RpV. 286,
300 (1972).
46. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 40 HARV. L. REv. 4, 25
(1936).
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Congress after full debate or embodied in legislation recently enacted by most states. Political decisions such as these ought to be
considered controlling not because they evidence societal normswere they only evidence they would, presumably, be subject to refutation by other evidence-but because the process that has led to
them is the ultimate source of law's legitimacy in a democratic
society. That process confers legitimacy upon the decision not
merely because it registers consent in some abstract way but, as I
have urged elsewhere, because
political responsibility is crucial to the democratic ideal that governmental policies ought to respond to the wishes of the citizenry ...
First, it provides a means by which government is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon the various segments of the society
and thereby contributes to the calculation of gains and losses resulting from that policy. Second, since an appraisal of the consequences
of policy involves not merely a measurement of gains and losses, but
a judgment of what is to count as a gain or loss and how these shall
be balanced, political responsibility helps ensure that governmental
policy will not depart too far from the values of citizenry. Finally,
the political responsibility of the legislature creates an incentive for
compromise and accommodation that facilitates developments
of poli47
cies that maximize the satisfaction of constituents' desires.
A consensus achieved through a broadly representative political
process is, thus, as close as we are likely to get to the statement of
a norm that can be said to reflect the values of the society.
Most governmental action that is subject to constitutional challenge is not, however, the product of a process that can reasonably
be understood as establishing societal norms. Often the decisions
that underlie such action have been taken by administrative bodies
that lack direct political responsibility. Even when political responsibility is more direct, the limited functional responsibilities of, say,
a school board or the limited constituency of a city council or even
a state legislature preclude a claim that their decisions can be taken
as establishing societal norms. Such bodies of course have important
decisionmaking responsibilities, but it is generally understood that
those responsibilities are to be performed within the framework of
norms that the larger society regards as fundamental. Judicial review of their decisions may thus be seen as a means of increasing
the prospects that the actions of politically subordinate governmental
institutions respect broadly shared national values. The purpose of
such review is not to check democracy, but to promote it by ensuring
that the evolution of such values occurs through an appropriate
process.
47. Sandalow, supra note 30, at 695.
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Many decisions of Congress, similarly, cannot reasonably be
understood as establishing societal norms. Frequently, the issues
that underlie a constitutional challenge to legislation have not been
noticed in the course of its enactment, perhaps because they were
overlooked, perhaps because the issues have become apparent only
in particular applications of the legislation that were not clearly anticipated. Even when such issues have been noticed, they may have
received only cursory examination, and then only in committee, for
the attention of the Congress may have been directed at other
features of the legislation or, as must often occur, the legislation itself may have generated insufficient interest to elicit the full attention of Congress. Inability to consider carefully many of the constitutional issues raised by legislation is the product of conditions and
practices deeply embedded in Congress' structure and processes,
including the size of its workload, the division of labor that the workload requires, and, when legislation has only regional significance,
the tendency to defer to the judgment of those legislators whose constituencies are most immediately affected. The effect of such conditions and practices upon the ordinary operations of Congress not only
suggests that the mere enactment of legislation should not be understood as an authoritative statement of societal norms, but also that
there is need for an institution to examine the question whether
legislation that has not received full attention of Congress respects
values that within our tradition may reasonably be regarded as fundamental.
I am not suggesting that legislation should be held unconstitutional merely because it has failed to receive full-scale consideration
by Congress. My point, rather, is that if governmental action
trenches upon values that may reasonably be regarded as fundamental, that action should be the product of a deliberate and broadly
based political judgment. The stronger the argument that governmental action does encroach upon such values, the greater the need
to assure that it is the product of a process that is entitled to speak
for the society. Legislation that has failed to engage the attention
of Congress, like the decisions of subordinate governmental institutions, does not meet that test, for it is likely to be the product of
partial political pressures that are not broadly reflective of the society
as a whole. In subjecting such legislation to constitutional review,
courts do not stand sentry over democracy. They serve, rather, as
its agent, an institution whose purpose is to help ensure that the effective delegations of power required in a complex society do not
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lead to governmental action that departs from the society's fundamental values.
If judicial review is to be understood in this way, however, courts
must be prepared to yield to political decisions that do reflect the
deliberate judgment of representative institutions which, just because
they are representative, can speak for the society more authoritatively than can courts. Once an historical standard of constitutional
interpretation has been abandoned, a bridge that in the United States
was crossed long ago, there is no higher standard to which courts
can appeal. It follows that Gobitis and Barnette should be understood as presenting a quite different problem from that posed in the
hypothetical case stated above, in which Congress after full debate
has required public school students to participate in flag salute ceremonies. Neither the school board in Gobitis nor the administrative
agency in Barnette can plausibly be understood to speak with the
same authority as the Congress in representing the views of the
nation. If, therefore, constitutional law is to be understood as expressing evolving social norms, it seems entirely appropriate that the
Supreme Court might hold, as it did in Barnette, that a compulsory
flag salute ceremony adopted by an administrative agency is an impermissible burden upon religious freedom and yet sustain precisely
the same requirement if it were to be subsequently enacted by
Congress.
Judicial determinations of unconstitutionality would on this analysis become suspensive vetoes; their effect would be similar to that
currently given to decisions invalidating state legislation under the
commerce clause. Instead of exercising a power that they can no
longer justify, that of determining the limits of the political process,
courts would, as they now do under the commerce clause, concern
themselves with ensuring that governmental decisions which touch
upon interests that our society regards as fundamental are made
through an appropriate process. Giving judicial decisions the effect
of suspensive vetoes would not, as critics of the thesis may wish to
suggest, confer upon Congress a power to amend the Constitution,
any more than conventional analysis authorizes courts to amend the
Constitution when it recognizes the propriety of their reinterpreting
the document's provisions in the light of evolving social values. It
would merely recognize that if constitutional law is to evolve over
time, the legitimacy of the changes depends upon popular consent
expressed through a democratic political process and that, once the
meaning of the Constitution is loosed from its historical moorings,
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there is no standard to which a court can repair for the purpose of
imposing limits on that process.

The belief that judicial review is a necessary bulwark against the
excesses of democracy will lead some readers to conclude that acceptance of the argument sketched in the preceding paragraphs
would deprive minorities of the most important safeguard of their
interests. I cannot in a brief essay lay such fears completely to rest,
but perhaps enough may be said to indicate that they are greatly exaggerated. The argument that I have advanced calls for judicial
submission only to decisions that have been deliberately made by
Congress and, perhaps also, to decisions expressed in legislation
adopted by most states. In assessing the impact of that suggestion
upon minorities, it is important to understand that the political process leading to such decisions contains prodigious internal safeguards
for their interests.
Foremost among these is the effect upon the political process of
the extraordinary variety of interest groups in the United States and
the crosscutting loyalties and identifications that exist among the
members of such groups. As long ago as the 10th Federalist, perhaps still the most important contribution by an American to political
theory, Madison pointed out the importance of diversity in guarding
against the "tyranny of the Majority":
Extend the sphere [of democratic government] and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; and you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their
own strength, and to act in unison with each other. 48
Read as a prediction, Madison's argument has proved to be remarkably prescient, though perhaps in ways that he did not fully foresee.
Political parties have arisen as the "mobilizer of majorities," and it
is through them that "the will of the majority" is expressed. But,
as Carl Auerbach has written:
To mobilize a majority of the votes in an election, each political
party must appeal to a variety of "interests" and a wide spectrum
of opinion. As a consequence of their catholicity, the major parties
are unthinkable as instruments of tyranny because "it is impossible
for the party in power to oppress any element of the opposition party
without oppressing a corresponding element within its own ranks."
48.

THE FEDRALIST

No. 10, at 61 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (J. Madison).
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In addition, the party in power knows that any effort to "tyrannize"
a particular minority may also antagonize other groups in the majority
coalition, as well as the "independents" pursued by both major parties, and, therefore, may cost it the next election.

In short, the "monolithic" majority.

.

does not exist; the major-

ity is but a coalition of minorities which must49 act in a moderate,

broadly representative fashion to preserve itself.
Whether or not one is prepared to go as far as Sidney Hook in proclaiming that "'the dictatorship of the majority' [is a] bugaboo which
haunts the books of political theorists but has never been found in
the flesh in modern history," 50 it seems plain that pluralistic politics
furnish substantial safeguards to minorities in those situations in
which I have urged that courts must yield to legislative judgment.
For it is in just those situations that the visibility of governmental
decisions permits minorities to draw upon the full range of protections that pluralism offers.
In recent years, the idea that pluralism serves an an effective
safeguard of minority interests has come under increasing attack.
Thus, Judge J. Skelly Wright, in a spirited defense of the Warren
Court's decisions, has written that "[t]he big winners in the
pluralistic system are the highly organized, wealthy, and motivated
groups skilled in the art of insider politics. They have resources to
trade for other benefits, and the resources that it takes to press their
claims successfully."'" But, he goes on to argue, "unorganized,
poor, unskilled minorities" who lack these resources do not obtain
similar advantages: their interests are not the ones that "the pluralistic system regularly rewards."52 Thus, he concludes, courts must
take an active role in defending those interests.
The question of how well "unorganized, poor, unskilled minorities" fare in pluralistic politics is, however, more complex than Judge
Wright's comments suggest, and it calls for a correspondingly more
refined analysis of the courts' role than he advances. Initially, there
as a need to distinguish, as he does not, between the ability of minorities to obtain the enactment of legislation they desire and their ability
to block legislation they oppose. Only the latter is relevant in assessing the argument that courts should submit to deliberate decisions
by Congress or by most state legislatures. Even the most avid pro49. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote,

One Value, 1964 Sup. Cr.REv. 1, 52 (citations omitted).
50. S. HOOK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM 66 (1962).
51. Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REv. 769, 789 (1971).
52. Id.
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ponents of an active judicial role in protecting minorities have not
suggested that judicial power extends to declaring legislative inaction
unconstitutional. The power of judicial review is the power to declare invalid legislation that has been enacted. But it is precisely
in the opportunities that it offers for blocking legislation that the politics of pluralism offers the greatest protection to minorities.
Within the Congress, moreover, minorities are further protected
by an organizational structure and procedures that permit them to
exercise power beyond mere numbers to prevent enactment of legislation inconsistent with their interests. Bicameralism, the committee
system, the filibuster in the Senate, the Rules Committee in the
House, and a host of other familiar devices for retarding the enactment of legislation are weapons in the legislative struggle. The opportunities they provide for deflecting legislation added to the
powerful moderating influence of pluralistic politics make it virtually
certain that any legislation that is enacted will not be seriously inimical to the interests of minorities. Judicial review of such legislation
does not, thus, serve to protect minorities from the "parade of
horribles" that are generally trotted out in the course of its defense.
It merely permits courts to substitute their decisions for those of Congress on issues that are likely to call for rather nice judgments about
the appropriate balance between competing interests that have come
into conflict. The balance struck by Congress, just because the enactment of legislation confronts so many hurdles, may fairly be
understood to be supported by a broad popular consensus. It is, as
I have urged throughout, difficult to understand what warrant courts
can claim for setting their judgment against such a consensus.
Accepting deliberate and broadly based political decisions as authoritative may, moreover, purchase a significant gain in the legitimacy of judicial efforts to protect minorities from the most serious
hazards they confront in the political process and, in doing so, contribute substantially to the effectiveness of those efforts. The most
serious threats to minorities, as a survey of the United States Reports
will reveal, come from governmental action that does not rest upon
such decisions. The safeguards of the legislative process, as Judge
Wright suggests, are generally available only to protect those groups
whose numbers and organization permit them to gain the attention
of Congress. Groups that cannot make visible the threat to their
interests are likely to find those interests overlooked or, if noticed,
given scant attention. So also, experience demonstrates that state
and local governments are typically less sensitive to minority interests
than the Congress. Conventional constitutional analysis unnecessar-
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ily restricts judicial power to protect minorities from these hazards.
Since it regards the decisionmaking process that underlies challenged
governmental action as irrelevant to the validity of that action, it
treats a determination that a local ordinance, a state statute, or inadequately considered federal legislation is unconstitutional as establishing that similar legislation subsequently enacted by Congress would
also be invalid, however deliberate might be the process leading
to its enactment. Courts are thus led to approach the former
with a deference they do not deserve. Doctrines that would permit courts to take account of differences in the decisionmaking
processes leading to challenged governmental action would, thus,
contribute to the courts' ability to protect minorities in those situations in which that protection is most likely to be needed. But, as
suggested above, the analysis that leads to taking account of such
differences also requires that courts must defer finally to deliberate
decisions by broadly representative political institutions.

This brief sketch is, of course, insufficient to describe, much less
to justify, a convincing alternative to more conventional theories of
the judicial role in constitutional adjudication. My purpose is merely
to suggest that a more modest statement of the courts' role may add
significantly to its legitimacy and, moreover, that it may do so without
significantly impairing the courts' ability to protect minorities. The
persuasiveness of that suggestion depends, however, upon whether
the several steps in the argument can survive a more complete analysis than is set out in the preceding pages.
First, the claim that constitutional law must now be understood
as expressing contemporary norms regarding the distribution and
limits of governmental power requires both elaboration and defense. As stated, the claim is likely to be considered extreme, as
in a sense it is. Norms do not arise spontaneously; they have a history and, in the United States, that history includes the Constitution.
Nevertheless, as I have argued briefly, and as I believe a more complete argument would establish even more convincingly, the evolving
content of constitutional law is not controlled, nor even significantly
guided, by the Constitution, understood as an historical document.
The claim that constitutional law must now be understood as expressing contemporary norms is not, moreover, merely an effort to
describe its current content. It rests, in part, upon an argument concerning the functions that constitutional law has come to perform in

HeinOnline -- 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1193 1976-1977

1194

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1162

our system. A complete defense of the claim thus requires an identification of those functions and an analysis of their importance and
of the reasons that they could not be performed if courts were limited
to textual exegesis in giving content to constitutional law.
Second, there is a need to consider in much greater detail the
process by which the norms to be expressed in constitutional law
should be constructed. In the large, it seems fairly evident that once
constitutional law is loosed from its moorings in the historical document, the norms that it expresses must be the evolving norms of the
society. But, as I have urged, societal norms cannot be directly apprehended, for they do not exist independently of the process by
which they are constructed. Our history establishes that courts are
to have a role in the process, but what that role should be is less
firmly established. Any attempt to answer that question must consider not only the limits upon the role implied by our commitment
to democracy, and thus the nature of that commitment, but also the
contribution that courts can make to the process by which societal
values are defined and realized.
Third, the suggestion that courts ought to distinguish between
governmental actions that establish societal norms and those that do
not requires considerable elaboration. Two questions in particular
call for further attention. First, in light of our tradition of federalism, what weight should be given to the decisions of a state legislature? I have suggested that the decisions of one or a few state legislatures ought not to be understood as establishing societal norms but
that perhaps the concurrence of many should be. Defending that
position requires an examination of the contemporary condition of
federalism in the United States. Second, the suggestion that courts
ought to distinguish between those acts of Congress that do and do
not represent deliberate decisions fails to indicate how courts are to
make that determination. Although I believe that they can do so,
and that constitutional decisions are in fact often influenced by judicial perceptions of the deliberateness of congressional judgments,
the argument remains to be made.
Fourth, many students of constitutional law believe that the
ability of courts, and especially of the Supreme Court, to perform
the functions that our history has thrust upon them depends upon
a popular understanding that courts are the ultimate expositors of
the meaning of the Constitution. It is a fair question whether courts
can maintain the role that my argument assigns them if it is generally understood that their decisions do not rest upon the Constitution
and that they may be overturned by the ordinary processes of legislation.
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Finally, a full defense of the thesis I have sketched requires
assessment of the extent to which its acceptance would alter the existing content of constitutional law. In the large, constitutional law
is an important repository of our national experience. A theory that
calls for massive repudiation of that experience is not likely to be
heeded, nor should it be. The object of a theory of judicial review
is, or should be, to achieve substantial consonance between the body
of decisions that compose constitutional law and generally accepted
principles governing the distribution of governmental authority. Of
course, no theory is likely to achieve complete harmony. But a
theory that is consistent with those principles and that accounts for
most decisions, especially those that are most confidently thought to
definition of
be correct, may point the way to a more satisfactory
53
doubt.
in
is
role
that
which
in
cases
in
the courts' role
Conventional theories of judicial review fail the test stated in the
preceding paragraph. They either do not explain the evolving content
of constitutional law, or they cannot be reconciled with principles that
define the nation's commitment to democracy. Whether the theory
that I have advanced is more satisfactory is a question that can be
answered only after a more detailed description of it than that
offered in this essay.
53. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 46-53.
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